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While hardware resources in the form of both tran-
sistors and full microprocessor cores are now abundant,
economic factors prevent specialized hardware mecha-
nisms required for secure processing from being inte-
grated into commodity parts. We are exploring a novel
way in which commodity hardware can be augmented
after fabrication to enhance secure operation for only
those systems that require it. Our methods will be
applicable to a wide range of security problems, includ-
ing the detection and isolation of hardware subversion
and Trojan horses, cache-based side channels in chip
multi-processors (CMPs), embedded systems security,
and hardware intrusion detection and prevention.
Utilizing off-the-shelf components to build trustwor-
thy systems results in a constant battle with the underly-
ing machine to provide separation, isolation, and protec-
tion. This problem is exacerbated by the movement to
multi-core processors since security functionality (e.g.,
strong security primitives) is rarely considered a priority
at the platform ISA or micro-architecture levels and
since features exploitable by adversaries (e.g., resource
sharing) are included for performance at the expense of
security. Without a significant shift in the way computing
systems are constructed (from the software down to the
circuits), unacceptable amounts of time and resources
will be spent attempting to contain the vulnerabilities
introduced by each new processor performance feature.
To address these problems, we are pursuing a radical
transformation in the way trustworthy systems are de-
veloped and deployed, one that allows direct hardware
support for fine grain control of the underlying hard-
ware system, yet that can still leverage the performance
and cost benefits provided by the latest commodity parts
through the augmentation of those parts with a 3-D
Integration approach.
Hardware manufacturers are reluctant to make hard-
ware support for trustworthy systems a priority. Incor-
porating strong security enhancements requires signifi-
cant resources, and integrating these mechanisms into a
complex design presents many practical and theoretical
problems, driving up the costs and prolonging the release
schedule – all of which is unacceptable in the extremely
cost sensitive desktop market. Trustworthy computing
systems are caught between the competing pressures to
provide complete and precise security policy enforce-
ment and the need to leverage the performance and
resources associated with the latest commodity products
and parts.
We intend to disentangle the security mechanisms
from the design, consolidating them onto a security over-
lay, a separate layer of circuitry, called a control plane,
that is stacked on top of a commodity integrated circuit.
The security mechanisms that reside in the control plane
can then be connected to the underlying chip, called
the computation plane, with any number of die-stacking
technologies, yet can be left unattached to enable the
manufacturer to continue to sell the un-enhanced product
at a lower cost. Attaching multiple planes together in 3-
D stacks is a new yet already marketed technology [1],
which is being explored by many major microprocessor
manufacturers [2], [3], [4]. 3-D devices contain multiple
active layers1, which are interconnected using techniques
such as through-silicon vias (TSVs), also referred to as
posts. A similar 3-D Integration approach has already
been used to implement profiling functions in the control
plane [5], [6].
This work has the potential to cut across all levels of
the system stack, from the application software, through
the operating system, the computer architecture, down
to the level of circuits and packaging. Various problems
need to be solved at each layer for this approach to
be successful. For example, the control plane’s ability
to enforce policies depends on circuit-level capabilities
for monitoring and restricting activity if needed. The
challenge is that these restrictions can disable some func-
tionality in the computation plane, but the computation
plane must be fully functional in its absence. Another
challenge is how to integrate different technology nodes
(e.g., a 130nm and 45nm fabrication process for the
control and computation planes, respectively).
The ability to enhance commodity hardware with
application-specific security functionality is applicable to
a wide range of hardware security issues:
• CMPs suffer from cache-based side channels be-
cause cores can observe the cache evictions of other
cores. To address this problem, we will intercept
and manage traffic destined for the cache-bus, forc-
ing signals on the computation plane to take a
detour to the control plane, where a cache manager
will mediate access to the cache.
• To isolate untrusted software running on the mul-
tiple cores in the computation plane, we will use
posts from the control plane to disable specific
wires in the computation plane, allowing us to
cut those connections that violate isolation require-
ments. To provide controlled sharing of resources,
we will use the control plane to mediate the in-
teraction of cores and other system resources in
the computation plane. Using disabling posts paired
with bypass posts, we will force signals on the
computation plane to be rerouted to the control
plane, where the legality of the requested action can
be checked against a security policy. The control
plane can also be used for isolated execution of
sensitive code such as proprietary programs or
crypto processing, as well as for storage of high
integrity code and data.
• The control plane can be used to monitor and
log the interactions of cores in the computation
1The active layer is the silicon layer where transistors reside,
and metal layers are fabricated above that to connect the transistors
together.
plane. A 3-D approach provides protection of both
the configurable hardware audit mechanism and
protected storage of the audit records. Control plane
functions can be used to detect hardware intrusions,
subversions, Trojans, and information leakage, in-
cluding covert channels, side channels, and direct
channels in the computation plane.
• The control plane can contain an object reuse mech-
anism that clears the sensitive state of a core after
one task finishes but before the next task begins.
Logic in the control plane can sanitize both the
intra- and inter-core shared resources. The control
plane can also be used to configure and initialize
computation plane cores.
• The control plane can be used to implement a
variety of high-integrity data tagging schemes, such
as security classification tags that mark outgoing
datagrams with the sensitivity label of the sending
core, provenance tags that indicate the source of
inter-core data transfers, and persistent memory tags
that indicate which core most recently modified a
given memory segment.
The current trends of building trustworthy systems
atop increasingly complex and less well understood hard-
ware make such systems increasingly costly to deploy
and maintain. This research introduces a fundamentally
new method by which security mechanisms can be
incorporated into hardware and thus has the potential
to significantly shift the economics of trustworthy sys-
tems. With our approach, trustworthy systems can be
built quickly using unmodified commodity processors
equipped with a customized control plane that provides
configurable, application-specific security functionality.
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